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It is easier to make one’s way in the world if one has some sort of expectation of the 
world’s future behaviour. Even when facing a very complex problem, we are rarely 
in a state of full ignorance: some expectations of system behaviour and the level 
of risk arising from uncertainty are usually available and it is on the basis of these 
expectations that most decisions are taken. Humans use models, which are mental 
or formal representations of reality, to generate these expectations, employing an 
ability that is shared more or less by all forms of life. Whether it is a tree responding 
to shortening day length by dropping its leaves and preparing its metabolism for the 
winter ahead or a naked Pleistocene ape storing food in advance of winter for the 
same reasons, both are using models. This view leads to two outcomes. The first is 
that predictions, seen as an expectation of ranges of future behaviours, are not just 
desirable, but necessary for decision-making. The often-asked question ‘do models 
provide reliable predictions?’ then shifts to ‘given a certain problem, what type of 
models provide the most useful and reliable prediction?’ The second outcome is that 
modelling is no longer a scientist’s activity but is instead a social process. Different 
types of models can be employed to ensure that all available information is included 
in model building and that model results are understood, trusted and acted upon. 
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1 Introduction
For a discussion of models we begin from what may seem an unusual point: 
a definition of life. Rosen [1] introduced the concept of anticipatory systems, 
suggesting that a defining distinction between living and non-living systems lies 
in the need for the living to anticipate the future behaviour of their environment 
and the likely outcome of their interaction with it. Loosely speaking, a ball  
rolling towards a wall is bound to hit the wall, while a living being provided  
with perception can detect the presence of the wall, anticipate the impact and,  
if convenient, plan for its avoidance. 
This idea is at the core of much work in artificial intelligence as well as in 
complex system science, as formalised in the computational mechanics literature 
[2–5]: agents store information from the past and from it extract regularities. 
These regularities are a ‘model’ of the environment, which is used to anticipate 
(predict) its future behaviour. The number and sophistication of the regularities 
the agent is able to store and process are measures of a model’s complexity. 
Forms of life at different levels of the evolutionary tree are able to use models  
of higher and higher complexity. At one extreme, bacteria hardwire simple models 
in their biological structure, while at the other extreme humans employ conscious 
mental processes and store formal mathematical tools in books and computers. 
Nonetheless, they both ‘model’ and ‘predict’.
From this perspective, a computational Earth System model running on a 
supercomputer is ‘just’ a sophisticated solution humans have evolved to address 
their need to interact with their environment. More important for our discussion, 
according to this approach modelling (including computational modelling) is not 
only a natural but also an essential activity.
This view of the role and purpose of models may not match our intuition, 
according to which highly complex processes are extremely hard to understand. 
Also our experience tells us that complex dynamics often appear to be controlled 
by surprises rather than regularities. This has led many authors to claim that 
the use of computer modelling to study and predict complex processes is 
unwarranted. This criticism takes many forms, which for the sake of conciseness 
we summarise in three points: a) computational models have a very poor 
prediction track record [6, 7]; b) most model predictions are not testable because 
of their conditional nature [8–11]; and c) behind an appearance of objectivity, 
model outcomes reflect the subjective beliefs and assumptions of model users [12, 
13]. According to this criticism, the benefit of modelling is limited to one or more 
of these activities: explanation of past events, understanding of natural processes, 
learning [14] or simply providing an avenue for communications [14, 15]. 
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This criticism is very important. However, it is based on a crucial assumption 
and a misunderstanding. The assumption is that a prediction is desirable but 
not necessary; that is, a prediction is an ideal or discretionary input to, not a 
requirement for, decision-making. Our discussion above suggests the opposite:  
if we accept that a prediction is essential to any decision-making, then the 
question would shift from ‘can model predictions be trusted?’ to ‘how do models 
compare to other approaches to prediction?’ We thus need to address this crucial 
question: is prediction desirable or necessary for planning and decision-making?
The misunderstanding has to do with the habit scientists have of using whatever 
is available—in this case, models—to do science. While prediction as we are 
describing it requires models, models can be used for more than prediction—they 
can be used for exploration and understanding and even control [16]. Prediction 
need not necessarily be scientific—although we argue that, at its best, it is.
2 About prediction
Three concepts are fundamental to our discussion. First, for prediction we do not 
intend the anticipation of an exact behaviour or event, rather an estimation of its 
likely limits. In other words, a prediction should not be understood as a prophecy 
[11]. For example, while it is widely known that weather forecasts are not reliable 
past 5–6 days, no one would believe that the temperature in Darwin in summer 
could be 40○C or –40○C with equal probability; as a result no one would travel to 
Darwin in January with a ski jumper. The limited predictability past 5–6 days still 
has allowed a certain level of effective planning by avoiding carrying unnecessary 
clothing. Second, predictions are conditional: any prediction is carried out 
within a context and is valid only within that context. In the above example the 
conditioning is given by our understanding of tropical climate; should this change, 
the prediction would no longer hold and would require updating [16]. Finally, 
the effectiveness of a prediction is scale-dependent [17]. For example, while the 
geophysical community is today sceptical about its ability to provide accurate 
prediction on where and when large earthquakes can occur, it is nevertheless 
able to predict the broad geographical areas in which large earthquakes can 
be expected. While this kind of predictability seems to offer little to planning 
[18], it still has considerable practical impact in deciding, for example, in which 
geographical areas expensive antiseismic constructions methods are necessary 
and where they are not. Once understood in these terms prediction becomes an 
integral part of any decision-making process: formulating a plan implies choosing 
among potential alternatives and envisaging ( = predicting) which one is more 
likely to deliver desired outcomes [19]. 
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If we accept that prediction is necessary for planning and decision-making, then 
it is important to next ask what tools provide the most reliable prediction given 
the problem at hand. Notice that this question is problem-dependent, not only 
because different problems may require different approaches, but also because 
the most accurate prediction is not necessarily the most reliable. Together with 
using numerical models or other computational tools predictions can be provided 
by experts, local knowledge or participatory settings. It is thus important to 
compare the predictive performance of computational models against alternative 
approaches on the core items of criticisms discussed above: a) prediction track 
record; b) lack of testability due to their conditional nature; and c) inherent 
subjectivity. 
We are not aware of any large-scale comparisons of the predictive accuracy 
of models and alternative methods. However, the available literature on the 
logical and attitudinal fallacies that even experts display for simple dynamical 
problems should warn us that it is probably unwarranted to expect humans to 
mentally predict the behaviour of highly complex systems in a consistent and 
reliable manner [20-28]. Predictions provided by experts, local knowledge 
and participatory settings will also be dependent on both explicit and implicit 
conditioning, including tacit information and hidden assumptions. A discussion 
of different forms of conditioning and its impact on modelling can be found 
in [29]. As nicely argued in [30], modelling offers an avenue for making such 
conditioning and assumptions explicit by coding and documenting the model, 
which may be sidestepped or not considered necessary in alternative approaches. 
Naturally, the same reasoning applies to the subjective nature of predictions.
So we arrive at a more expansive view of prediction for humans than just 
‘expectation of the future’. We need to include the human knowledge of the past 
(culture), the human need to explore and understand (science) and the human bias 
to act (policy and intervention). Together these colour our approach to prediction 
and the sorts of models we tend to use.
3 Types of models
Accepting that models are a necessary component of a decision-making 
process does not imply believing that a) modelling reduces to running a single 
sophisticated computational model; b) that modelling is something only scientists 
do; and c) that the outcome of a model should be trusted uncritically. In fact, 
much of our work has been based on preaching and practising the opposite: 
a) models need to be built by teams including scientists and model recipients 
because much of the information needed to implement a model is implicit or 
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tacitly held; b) model results need to be carefully explained and understood in 
order to be trusted and acted upon by decision makers; and c) information about 
uncertainty in the model outcome is crucial to formulate an effective plan. 
As a result, our approach to modelling focuses on treating ‘building a model’ 
as the catalyst rather than the final aim of the process. In other words, extensive 
interactions between scientist, decision-makers and model recipients to introduce, 
showcase, discuss and tune the model used for final decision-making become both 
a requirement and an opportunity to ensure model relevance and acceptance and 
increase the broader understanding of the system’s function. To fulfil these roles 
we develop five broad classes of models: conceptual, toy, single-system, shuttle, 
and full-system [also see Volume 1, Chapter 5]. 
In conceptual models the main drivers of a system are highlighted for subsequent 
representation as components of the model. This first kind of model is usually 
expressed as a conceptual diagram summarising our understanding of system 
function. In toy models a problem is simplified in such a way that only a handful 
of components are included. Their purpose is mostly educational: we want to 
understand how each component affects the problem and in order to achieve this 
we temporarily renounce a satisfactory understanding of the overall problem. 
In single-system models we include a fairly detailed representation of a single 
component of the system. These can be used to introduce stakeholders to 
modelling, provide results from the study of a single activity (addressing sector-
specific issues) and feed into the development of a final full-system (multisector) 
model. In shuttle models [31] (or minimum realistic models), we include the 
minimum number of processes we believe are crucial for a basic understanding 
of the overall problem. We know these models are simpler than they need to be 
for full-system description, but they provide a sufficient understanding to enable 
us to contemplate many questions with existing (often incomplete) datasets. 
These models can also be a useful stepping stone to building, using and correctly 
interpreting the more complex models needed to check for unexpected outcomes 
resulting for feedbacks buried in a full-problem description. The term ‘shuttle’ 
refers to taking us from a minimum to a full description of the problem, a journey 
that is necessary both to developers in model definition and parameterisation, and 
to stakeholders in the interpretation of the final full-system model results. Finally, 
the full-system model includes all information collected for a region and addresses 
all scenarios of stakeholders concern, whose definition has been greatly eased by 
using the ‘simpler’ models. 
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As an example, a conceptual model may identify population growth and 
industrialisation as two of the main drivers for climate change; a toy model may 
describe how emissions affect peak temperature; a single-system model may 
include the effect of regulations on national emissions; a shuttle-model may 
include a simplified representation of the interaction between economic growth, 
population dynamics and warming. This will gradually ‘take’ us to comprehend 
the ‘full’ model, which may include trade, financial market dynamics, 
sequestration, geo-engineering etc. Figure 1 summarises the stages at which 
different model types are employed, the role they play and how they can support 
the development and use of a full-system model. 
All of the model types have their own value and the full set need not always  
be employed—in some cases enough is learnt from conceptual models to  
improve predictions, in other cases the feedbacks captured in shuttle models 
are an effective means of refining predictions, while in others the system of 
interacting pressures and actors is sufficiently complex that only a full-system 
exposition can guide decision-makers through the complex network of feedbacks 
and unexpected outcomes of interactions. 
For complex issues, ‘full models’ may represent the crucial component of the 
‘anticipatory system’ according to Rosen’s definition: it is the tool that the 
decision-making team, as a unified agent, employs in order to explore and 
evaluate options for actions. The other model types allow for engagement of 
different parties involved in the decision-making team, including researchers, 
formal decision-makers and stakeholders at large. In other words, they help the 
decision-making team work as a team. In particular, they can: a) allow a less-
biased interpretation of available information; b) allow for learning of specific 
skills and attitudes needed when facing complex problems; and c) provide an 
avenue for communication and collaboration.
Allowing a less biased interpretation of available information is important 
because people with different world views may interpret and draw very different 
conclusions from the same information [32–40]. Research on attitudes to climate 
change, nanotechnology and vaccination, among other issues, shows how world 
views affect policy support more than available information does because these 
views filter how such information is processed. Accounting for such biases in a 
model (by parameterising the model according to different worldviews, [41]) may 
be a way to highlight the issue and the potential inconsistencies that may arise 
from it and move the discussion from perspectives to mechanisms in the hope that 
this may reduce the influence of biased information interpretation.
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Conclusion
We think that prediction is what living things do and that they do it through 
models. But we also think that the relationships between models and predictions 
are varied, and—importantly in the case of humans—dependent on the context. 
We also think that rather than diminishing or muddying the matter of prediction, 
this enriches it and places it in a very human context. Models could be better used 
and their results more trusted if this was better understood. 
Thus we argue that training on specific skills and attitudes is needed to help us 
face complex problems. This is important because scientific insights risk being 
lost unless they are understood by those making and supporting decisions: 
recent studies have shown that human cognition and psychology affect decision-
making at least as much as the complexity of the problem at hand [21, 23, 25, 
26, 42]. Computer models resembling flight simulators can be designed to train 
individuals to better understand the basic processes of real-world significance 
for decision-making, including management of limited resources and unexpected 
feedbacks. The belief underneath this approach is that managing and predicting 
complex behaviours can be learned and that models can represent systems in a 
manner appropriate for learning and training. 
Figure 1: Relation between a) a modelling project (top dark rectangle); b) different types of models 
(coloured ovals); and c) stakeholders engagement phases (yellow rectangles). The arrow at the bottom 
suggests an approximate chronological order. 
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Not only cognitive skills but also cognitive attitudes are crucial to effective 
decision-making about complex problems [24, 43, 44]—the behavioural attributes 
and habits we bring into a problem, the way we formulate goals, interpret 
outcomes against expectations and balance emotional responses like humility, 
curiosity, frustration and blame-shifting have a significant influence on how 
effectively we deal with complex situations [43]. Tangible, constructive means 
to improving problem solving in complex settings can be identified and trained 
via computer models [43, 45]. Interestingly, some of the most effective cognitive 
approaches (including tolerating high levels of uncertainty, acknowledging 
mistakes, searching for counterevidence, self-reflection etc.) can be in direct 
opposition to behaviours rewarded in political and management roles. More 
widespread awareness of what makes an effective decision-maker, possibly 
leading to improvements in training programs, may have an immense impact  
on a wide variety of real-world issues.  
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